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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. ALLAN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: Case No. 960512-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (f) 
(1992 as Amended) whereby a defendant in a district court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital 
felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that 
the officer had "reasonable suspicion" to justify the stop of 
Allan's vehicle? The standard of review on this issue is two-
fold: "The trial court's factual findings underlying its 
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are 
examined for clear error. On the other hand, the standard to be 
applied to the conclusion of law, i.e., whether the facts as 
1 
found give rise to reasonable suspicion, fis reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness1." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 
1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
This issue was preserved during a Suppression hearing (R. 
83-105). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when 
he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT QF THE? CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Michael R. Allan appeals from a conviction of Driving Under 
the Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 41-6-44. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court 
Allan was charged by Information with Driving Under the 
Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in Fourth Circuit Court, Provo 
Department, on or about March 27, 1995 (R. 4-7). 
On February 15, 1996, a Suppression hearing was conducted 
before the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Jr. at which Allan 
challenged whether the initial stop was supported by reasonable 
2 
suspicion (R. 83-105). Judge Harding denied Allan's motion to 
suppress (R. 84-85). A bench trial was subsequently held before 
Judge Harding on May 28, 1996, at which Allan was convicted of 
Driving Under the Influence (R. 71). On July 15, 1996, Allan was 
sentenced (R. 73). On or about July 29, 1996, Allan filed a 
Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court, Provo 
Department, and this action commenced (R. 78). 
STATEMENT QF REI*EVANT FACTS 
On March 13, 1995, at approximately 7:20 p.m., Officer Brian 
Moore of the Provo City Police Department was on routine patrol 
in the downtown Provo area (R. 102). At that time, he was 
dispatched to the Albertson's parking lot approximately four 
blocks from his current location (R. 102). Dispatch indicated 
that someone calling from a payphone at Albertson's was reporting 
"that they had seen somebody that was intoxicated, and they were 
concerned [that person was] going to drive" (R. 101). 
When Moore arrived at the parking lot, he looked to the 
payphone and saw an individual who was "trying to get my 
attention" (R. 101). Moore approached, and the individual 
pointed to a person walking in the parking lot who had exited a 
red camaro and was then returning to the car—although Moore 
"couldnft see him from where I was" and did not see him walking 
to the vehicle (R. 97, 100-01). In fact, Moore only knew the 
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make of the vehicle because the complainant said "This guy in 
that red camaro." 
Moore testified that his conversation with the individual at 
the payphone was "extremely brief" and that at its conclusion, 
the complainant walked into the store and was not seen by Moore 
again (R. 99-100). Moore also noted twice that the man "seemed 
really nervous for some reason" (R. 96, 100). The complainant 
did not leave his name with Moore, nor did Moore ever ask his 
name (R. 96). In addition, Moore testified that, at this point, 
he had no personal knowledge whether the person pointed out was, 
in fact, intoxicated or impaired; and that the complainant gave 
him no further information as to his belief of intoxication (R. 
95, 100). 
Moore then left the complaining individual and drove across 
the parking lot to confront the man in the red camaro (R. 99). 
Moore testified that "at this time I had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that there was possibly an intoxicated person there". 
Subsequently, as the red vehicle began to back out of a parking 
stall, Moore initiated a stop of the vehicle (R. 99). Moore 
testified that his reasonable suspicion of potential intoxication 
was based solely upon the information of the pay-phone 
complainant with whom, Moore assumed, must have had some basis 
for his report (R. 98). Moore did not observe a driving pattern 
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to assess the man's ability to operate his vehicle, he simply 
initiated a stop (R. 96). 
Eventually Moore arrested the man in the car—Michael Allanf 
the defendant—for Driving Under the Influence (R. 98); and at 
some point an intoxilyzer test was given and Allan blew .178 (R. 
Ill) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. An investigatory stop of a vehicle by law enforcement 
personnel constitutes a "seizure" under the constitution. 
Therefore, it can only be justified by the presence of 
"reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity arising from apparent 
facts known to the officer prior to the initial stop. In this 
case, there were no apparent facts known to Officer Moore which 
were sufficient to support a determination of "reasonable 
suspicion" relating to possible intoxication by Allan. 
Accordingly, the trial court erroneously denied Allan's motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained from the illegal stop; and Allan 
asks that this Court reverse his subsequent conviction and remand 
the case to the trial court with directions to suppress the 
evidence. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE OFFICER 
HAD "REASONABLE SUSPICION" TO STOP ALLAN'S VEHICLE 
Allan asserts that the trial court committed reversible 
error in its denial of his motion to suppress because the initial 
stop of Allan's vehicle was not supported by "reasonable 
suspicion." 
Police stop's of vehicles—regardless of how brief or how 
legitimate—constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 
1994). Accordingly, a criminal investigation stop—as was 
initiated here—must be justified from its inception and must be 
limited in its scope. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-
20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)). 
As in Case, it is the "justificaion" requirement which is at 
issue in this case: Did Officer Moore have "reasonable 
suspicion" of criminal activity to justify the stop of Allan's 
vehicle? See, Case, 884 P.2d at 1276. Such a determination is 
based upon an examination of "the totality of circumstances" and 
requires "specific and articulable facts" to support the 
suspicion. Id. 
Ordinarily the "specific and articulable facts" supporting 
reasonable suspicion arise from the personal observations and 
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inferences of the investigating officer. Case, 884 P.2d at 1276-
77. However, under certain circumstances—such as this case—an 
officer may rely on other sources of information. Xd. In such 
cases, "the legality of a stop based on information imparted by 
another will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts 
known to the individual originating the information... 
substantively received and acted upon by the investigating 
officer." Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 (emphasis in original). 
In other words "to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry, 
it must be determined if, from the facts apparent to the 
[investigating] officer and the reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, that officer would reasonably suspect that defendant 
was driving while intoxicated." State v. Rothr 827 P.2d 255, 257 
(Utah App. 1992). Allan asserts that from the facts apparent to 
Officer Moore, he could not have reasonably suspected that Allan 
was driving while intoxicated. 
In Roth, this Court was presented with another DUI case 
arising from an automobile stop which arose from information 
imparted to the investigating officer from another. This Court 
affirmed the trial court's determination of "reasonable 
suspicion" because "a reliable source with reasonable suspicion 
based on articulable facts [had] report[ed] the commission of a 
crime, [and] baded on the relayed facts, the dispatcher 
communicat[ed] the information to police," and the investigating 
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officer had made personal, articulable observations which 
corroborated the information received from dispatch. Roth, 827 
P.2d at 259. However, the articulated facts apparant to the 
officer and to this Court in Roth go far beyond the facts in this 
case. 
In Roth, the information given to dispatch, and subsequently 
relayed to the investigating officer, came from a security 
officer whom had observed Roth closely and had made the following 
observations relating to potential intoxication by Roth: slurred 
speech, glazed eyes, the smell of alcohol, and an erratic driving 
pattern. -Roth, 827 P.2d at 256. In addition, the security 
officer also relayed to dispatch the location, make, color and 
license plate number or Roth's vehicle. Rothr 827 P.2d at 257. 
Furthermore, the investigating officer dispatched to Roth's 
vehicle observed Roth "having a hard time driving" and personally 
noted a slow and jerky driving pattern by Roth prior to the stop 
of Roth's vehicle. Id. at 258. 
In this case, no such facts were apparent to Officer Moore, 
nor did Officer Moore have any personal observations to 
corroborate the pay-phone complainant's allegation of 
intoxication against Allan. Officer Moore observed no driving 
pattern by Allan (R. 96). Officer Moore had not seen Allan 
walking to his car (R. 95, 100-01) . Officer Allan had only an 
"extremely brief" conversation with the unnamed complainant who 
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"seemed nervous" (R. 96, 99-100). Moreover, the claimant 
expressed no information to either dispatch or to Officer Moore 
as to the basis for his belief that Allan was intoxicated. As 
this Court noted in Case, information about "whom to stop, by 
itself, is not enough to justify the stop if there are no 
articulable facts pointed to which establish why a stop is to be 
made." Case, 884 P.2d at 1278. 
Because there are no apparent facts apparent which establish 
reasonable suspicion in this case, i.e. why a stop was required, 
Allan asks that this Court hold, like it held in Case, that the 
trial court's determination of "reasonable suspicion" was 
incorrect and unsupported by the facts. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because the initial stop was Allan's vehicle was not 
supported by "reasonable suspicion", Allan respectfully asks that 
this Court reverse his conviction for Driving Under the 
Influence, and remand this matter to the Fourth District Court 
with directions that the evidence is to be suppressed and the 
matter is to be dismissed. 
DATED this ( day of March, 1997. 
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1 ! P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 I (Electronically recorded on February 15, 1996) 
THE COURT: We'll call the matter of Provo 
4 i City vs. Michael Allan. We're here for a suppression 
5 | hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress. 
6 | You may proceed, gentleman. 
7 | MR. ROMNEY: Thank you, your Honor We call 
8 Officer Moore. 
9 j THE COURT: Very well. 
I 
10 ! COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that; the 
11 I testimony you are about to give in this case now 
12 pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole 
13 I truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
14 THE WITNESS: I do. 
15 I MR. MEANS: Judge, just by way of 
16 J explanation, I'm only challenging the initial SLOP in 
this case. 
THR COURT: Very well. Why don't we limit 
19 i our testimony to that area. 
JO I MR. ROMNEY: Thank you. We'll (inaudible) 
21 i your Honor. 
BRIAN MOORE 
23 ! having been first duly sworn, 
24 I testifies as follows: 
25 I DIRECT EXAMINATION 
G0103 
1 
2 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
BY MR. ROMNEY: 
Q. Officer Moore, for the record, state your 
name and occupation, please. 
A. Brian Moore, patrol officer for Provo City 
Police Department. 
Q. Let me call your attention to the 13th of 
March, 1995 at about 7:20 in the evening on that date. 
Were you employed by Provo City and working as a 
police officer then? 
A. I was. 
Q 
A 
that time 
Q 
then? 
Do you recall at that time where you were? 
1 was in the downtown area specifically at 
Officer Moore, were you on routine patrol 
A. Yes. I was. 
Q. In your police vehicle? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. What happened at that time? 
A. At this particular time I was dispatched to 
a suspicious call in the Albertson's parking lot. 
Q. How far away from the Albertson's parking 
lot were you when you got the dispatch caU? 
A. Four blocks, tops. 
Q. what did you do? 
p 
A. I responded to that area. 
Q. Within what time period of having received 
the dispatch call? 
A. I would say probably one minute, close to a 
minute. 
Q. What happened then, Officer Moore? 
A. I got further information from my dispatch. 
They had indicated there was someone on the payphone 
at Albertson's, and this individual was indicating 
that they had seen somebody that was intoxicated, and[ 
they were concerned they were going to drive. 
Q. What did you do then when you got to the 
parking lot? 
A. When I first got to the parking lot I looked 
over to the payphone and saw the individual that was 
still on the phone with our dispatch, who wes trying 
to get my attention. 
Q. By doing what? 
A. He was waving his hands and pointing, 
Q. Did you approach that person? 
A. I did approach him. He hung up the phone 
and came over towards my vehicle -- I hadn't exited my 
vehicle at this time, and he pointed and indicated 
that there was an individual walking that had just 
gotten out of a red camero and was going back to the 
G010.1 
s 
red camero, and that he believed him to be 
intoxicated. 
Q. What vehicle was pointed out to you? 
A. It was just a -- the only red camero in the 
parking lot that J saw --we were on the southeast 
side of the parking lot, and just one row of cars 
there, and there was one in chat row. 
0- How long of a conversation did vou have with 
this individual who was on the payphone? 
A. Extremely brief. He seemed really nervous 
for some reason. 
Q. What did he do after you had conversed with 
him? 
A. Well, after he had conversed with me and 
pointed out this vehicle, that an individual was going 
to get into the vehicle, that directed my attention, I 
felt like that was extremely important to investigate 
instead of talk with the individual any longer. 
Q. You didn't have any knowledge yourself as to 
whether or not the individual pointed out was 
impaired? 
A. I didn't. T had no pre-knowledge. I was 
! going specifically 
And 
was 
then the 
going to 
by what a citizen's 
citizen turned around 
invest .igate and went 
complaint 
v/hen he Icnev/ 
into Albertson 
was. 
that 
's, 
I i 
OOKiO 
t 
23 
24 
25 
and I never saw him again. 
Q. What did you do then after you got the 
information from the citizen, Officer? 
A. The parking lot was really congested with 
people. It required me to go ahead and to drive back 
around through the parking lot in order to come up to 
this vehicle, because it was about four or five cars 
back. From where I was I couldn't back up, there was 
a car behind me. So I went and made contact with the 
vehicle. 
Q. By doing what? 
A. At this time I had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that there was possibly an intoxicated person 
there, so when T came back around I saw the vehicle 
had just started to back out of a parking stall, and I 
operated my overhead lights to detain them. 
Q. I take it at that point you initiated the 
stop of the vehicle by using your lights; is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now Officer Moore, you indicated that you 
had suspicion enough to stop that vehicle. Indicate, 
please -- particularize what that was and what it was 
based on. 
A. The stop itself? 
iP.il Q Q 
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Q. Yes. 
A. Well, I had a citizen who had observed 
somebody who was potentially intoxicated, and based on 
what they had told me, it gathered my reasonable 
suspicion that they had some type of contact with the 
individual -- I don't know what it was because I was 
never able to interview them myself. Based on that 
reasonable suspicion I made a stop to investigate in 
the event that there could be a crime of possible 
serious consequences. 
Q. Later on, I take it, you did make an arrest? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And v/ere you able to identify the driver of 
that vehicle? 
A. I did. 
Q. By what names and as whom? 
A. From what I recall he did have a Utah 
driver's license in his possession. 
Q. Showing the person to be whom? 
A. Mr. Michael Allan. 
Q. Would you recognize the same person if he 
were here in this courtroom? 
A. I do. He is at the defendant's table. 
MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, for the limited 
purposes of this hearing only, that's all the 
r.ii 
questions I have. 
THE COURT: Very well, thank you. Mr 
Means? 
MR. MEANS: Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
B^ MR. MEANS: 
Q. Officer Moore, the person that called this 
in was apparently still on the phone when you arrived 
at the Albertson's parking lot? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you had a brief conversation with him, 
and he pointed out the defendant to you? 
A. He pointed out the defendant. I did not net 
visua] contact with the defendant because he was 
walking to his vehicle and had already passed my 
vehicle, and I just couldn't see him from where I WPS. 
Q. Did you see the defendant walking to his 
vehicle? 
A. I did not. 
Q. He pointed out the defendant's vehicle? 
A. He pointed out -- he says, "This guy in that 
red camero." 
Q. And where at that time was the defendant? 
A. From what I understood, he was probably 
about 10 to 15 feet from his car going to get into his 
fi A n ^ 
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1 car. 
2 Q. To his car? 
3 A. Headed to his car. 
4 Q. So you weren't able to see him walking? 
5 A. I did not see him walking more than just a 
6 blur out of the corner of my eye. 
7 Q. And by "him11 I was referring to the 
8 j defendant, and you were, too? 
9 A. That's correct. 
10 Q. You didn't see the defendant driving his car 
11 such that you could observe a driving pattern and 
12 I assess his ability to operate his vehicle? 
13 A. That's correct, I did not. 
14 Q. And when you did get up behind hj s vehicle 
15 he had started it and just commenced backing out of 
16 his parking space? 
17 j A. That's right, the reverse lights were on. 
18 Q. And the citizen that pointed out the 
19 I defendant to you didn't leave his name? 
20 A. He seemed really nervous, and he just --
21 j after he knew that I was focusing on Mr. Allan, he 
22 disappeared. 
23 j 0. Did he tell you that he didn't want to be 
24 involved then? 
25 A. That was my presumption, but he didn't 
/N *\ s\ r\ 
specifically indicate that. 
Q. Did he give you any indication as to why he 
vas able to determine that this defendant might be 
under the influence? 
A. Not to me specifically. 
Q. So if I get the picture, it's a very brief 
encounter with this person who is unidentified, he 
appears to be very nervous and gave you the impression 
that he just wanted to point him out and then get out 
of the area, and he didn't give you any indication of 
what it was that he observed to draw the conclusion 
that he had drawn--
A. All 1 can speculate is from what my 
dispatch -- information they gave me. I can't say for 
sure what he told dispatch, but: what I received from 
dispatch was that he was impaired walking -- and I 
don't know what contact this individual had with him, 
but chere was some form. 
MR. MEANS: That's all I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Romney? 
MR. ROMNEY: I don't have anything else, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. You may step down. 
MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, one of the other-
officers, in speaking with him, arrived after the stop 
ft n n t: 
12 
had been made, so it would have nothing to add to this 
point in time. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. ROMNEY: So that's the evidence that we 
have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Means? 
MR. MEANS: We rest. 
THE COURT: Do you gentleman want to argue 
the matter? 
MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, it's Mr. Means' 
motion I'd like to respond to his argument. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. MEANS: Your Honor, the point of making 
this motion is just because of the evidence that you 
heard. I know that we have a long line of case lav; 
that states that officers can act upon citizen's 
information that they have observed, and the 
purpose -- as I read this case law, is that citizens 
generally are going to tell -- have no motivation, 
they are not trying to work out of a charge, they are 
not vindictive as a general rule, they are just trying 
to cooperate with the police. 
And so there's a general -- I think you 
start out with a general presumption that what the 
citizen tells you is to be, at least on its face, 
I * 
believed. And for the record, the officer wasn't able 
to cooberate what the citizen observed prior to making 
the stop, he didn't see him walking, he didn't see him 
driving, he didn't smell his breath, he didn't see his 
eyes, just 100 percent on what the citizen told him. 
But I think that the reason that those cases 
are there is that citizens are willing to step 
forward, identify themselves, tell them who chey are 
without the fear of repercussion, and give their 
information. But in this case this citizen wasn't --
didn't -- for whatever reason -- didn't cell the 
officer why he thought this person was under the 
influence. It was a mere conclusion. He didn't give 
the officer facts that the officer could act upon, 
unlike the case where che citizen might come forward 
and say, "I just followed this guy all the way down 
the canyon and he was weaving all around," something 
to give the officer something to base it on other than 
the bare conclusion of the citizen. 
Beyond that he didn't leave his name. In 
fact, it was just the opposite. He acted quite 
nervous, left the area, didn't give the officer any 
way to follow up and get back to him. The officer is 
not able to tell you that he gave dispatch any more 
information than he gave the officer. 
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And my point is that --if that's all it 
takes to get a citizen pulled over in Lhis country, 
then there are no checks and balances. Anyone who has 
a grudge who might have been cut-off going into a 
parking space, or who might be involved in a divorce 
or some domestic problem can simply call up the police 
and say, "I think so and so is drunk and he's driving 
his car," click. And then the person gets pulled over 
and there's no checks and balances. 
And I find that a little bit odd, because 
when officers who we know and who this Court has 
continued involvement in, even those officers when 
they say, "I pulled this person over because I saw a 
driving pattern," the officers themselves are 
subjected to being placed on the stand and cross 
examined by defense attorneys like me to make sure 
that they knew what they saw, they were in a position 
to observe, and they actually did smell the alcohol 
and were in a position to smell the alcohol, and their 
credibility is assessed, even though we know who they 
are. 
And you might have a long experience and 
have a good feeling of credibility for the individual 
officers, and I think there ought to be some 
assessment for the credibility on the basis of 
n A A l ^ 
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knowledge of a citizen who remains unidentified to 
tell the officers what he saw other than just, "I 
think he might be under the influence, that's it, I'm 
I out of here." 
I So I think in this case you've got just that 
I clear case. The citizen doesn't want to identify 
himself, he just gives a bare bones conclusion with no 
I facts to back it up, and the officer is not able, 
because of the circumstances, to observe on his own 
j cooberating evidence, and he acts entirely upon the 
I citizen's information, and I think that there's not 
I enough there in this situation for those reasons. 
THE COURT: Mr. Means, if I were to accept 
| your representation that that's what the testimony 
! was -- or accept your characterization, let's say, 
i that that's what the testimony was, and make my ruling 
I based thereon, is there a case law that supports your 
I position? 
i 
| MR. MEANS: T think that's what Mr. Romney's 
going to present to you is case law that supports the 
opposite, and I'm trying to distinguish. There are 
I cases where citizens have come forward and given 
information to officers and officers have acted upon 
it, but in those cases, the citizens have told them 
why they suspected the person did or is about to do 
r.n ni 
16 
what they did. 
Mr. Romney and I were involved in a case 
called Warden -- Provo City vs. Warden, and that was a 
case where two young boys had flagged over a Provo 
City Officer -- it's Devon Jensen from Provo City --
and said that this person, who was later the 
defendant, just came up to us and said, "Where can I 
buy some cocaine? I want to drive into a wall." 
The case stands from the proposition thee 
when officers have a reason to believe that someone's 
about to do harm to themselves they have a right to 
pull them over and find out what's going on. The 
fellow ultimately was charged with a DUI and 
convicted. 
But at least in that case the two kids gave 
the officer some information, they gave a statement 
that would cause someone to have alarm and so forth. 
Why do you suspect this person is going to cause harm 
to himself? Because he told us this. 
In this case, this particular citizen just 
simply said, "That guy is drunk. Take a look at him." 
He didn't say, "Well, I think he's drunk because I was 
just in the store, I was in the checkout line with him 
and I was standing behind him, and boy, he sure 
smelled -- and I watched him walk out and he weaved 
r> n o n 
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all the way to his car." It's just bare bones, "He's 
drunk." 
There's some other cases that Mr. Romney 
shared with me, the case of State vs. Roth. A citizen 
had gone to a hospital to get his girlfriend, I think, 
who was being discharged -- that's not relevant. But 
at any rate, when he presented himself to the security 
guards at the hospital he had the signs of 
intoxication, and the security guards reported it, and 
another officer responded and pulled the defendant 
over. 
And I think that's a real easy case to 
distinguish that security officers are named, we know 
who they are, they have some independent credibility, 
they can tell the officer why they thought the person 
was drunk because he came --in fact, the case states 
that they told the arresting officer, "This guy was 
just in the hospital, he reeked of alcohol, we thought 
he was under the influence but we didn't know he was 
driving. Once we knew he was driving he decided we 
needed to call the police." 
So I don't have cases that directly support 
my argument, but I have cases that say that officers 
should be responding on hints or tips that they get, 
but all of the cases that support that are from cases 
CO 89 
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where the citizen has given some good detailed 
information and told the officer why they believed 
this person was under the influence or needed to be 
looked at for some reason, 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Romney? 
MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, if I might -- I 
provided those copies for Mr. Means, if I might also 
for the Court. 
THE COURT: Yes, please. 
MR, ROMNEY: First of all, as to the Warden 
case, I think the pertinent part of that, your Honor, 
is headnote No. 5, page 361. The issue there was one 
of hearsay, and the question was whether or not the 
unidentified person's statement was hearsay. It 
wasn't, because it went to the officer's belief that 
the circumstances were exigent. The hearsay issue 
didn't come up here today, but I do think the same 
issue -- the same thing applies in that the officer, 
upon hearing that an individual is intoxicated and is 
going to get in his car, responds and immediately 
needs to do that, and did so. It explains that he 
felt the circumstances were exigent. 
I believe that the most compelling case 
here, your Honor, is Layton City vs. Moon, and I would 
point to headnote No. 1, "Police officer who saw only 
GO 88 
one vehicle dn the parking lot, which he had gone in 
response to dispatcher's coded message that an 
intoxicated person was about to become an intoxicated 
drdver. Ke verified with the store cleric that ne was 
the person dn Question and he observed the vehd cle go 
in the lot, and heard his slurred speech," and so on 
and so forth, "had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol." 
Your Honor, what we have here is an officer 
who goes immediately within literally a minute after 
he received the dispatch call from four bloclcs away, 
and responded to an individual who was still on th<=» 
telephone and pointed out to the officer, "That's the 
guy and that's his car, and he's going to get into 
it." J believe, your Honor, that that establishes an 
exigency, and the officer needed to do what he did, 
and the individual had indicated to the officer tb^u 
this was the person, this was the car, he was 
intoxicated. The officer is in fear that an 
intoxicated driver is going to drive away and stops 
him. 
T believe that that's in -- that purports 
with Utah case lav/, your Honor, and that the stop was 
certainly based on the reasonable .suspicion that the 
officer had and that he gained from the citizen 
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informant. 
I believe Mr. Means has correctly identified 
that citizen informants are given the presumption of 
J reliability, and I indicate, your Honor, for those 
I reasons, that the City would request that the motion i 
to suppress be denied. 
I THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Means? 
MR. MEANS: Your Honor, if I could just make I 
one statement with regard to the case of Moon that the 
i 
I prosecutor referred to. I would point out that in 
j that case the person who gave the call to the police | 
officer was the clerk of the Circle K, and he was 
i 
j still there when the officer responded. 
j By virtue of the fact that the case recites 
his name, we can conclude that he gave his name to the 
officer so that he could be identified, and he told i 
the officer -- lfm quoting the case, "According to 
! Willham," who was the clerk, "Moon stumbled, l'n s I 
| speech was slurred. When they talked about the open 
j 
trunk on his car he smelled of alcohol." And he had j 
I left his car lights on when he came into the Circle K. 
j Again, he gave some good detailed information to the 
!
 t i 
1
 officer about why he thought he was under the J 
i influence. 
i ! 
I But I think what these cases stand for is I 
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you take the statements of these citizens because you 
can presume they are reliable. You can presume they 
are reliable because they are volunteered, number one, 
and in this case, it was volunteered, so I think they 
have that. But the people identified themselves, they 
give seme information about why what they told the 
officer helped them draw the conclusion the person was 
under the influence. We don't have any of that stuff 
here. 
In fact, it's quite the opposite. This 
person gave body language signals to the officer that 
he didn't want to be involved, that he was nervous, 
I that he just said, "Hey, that's the guv, he's under 
i 
J the influence, f! and then he takes off. So that's why 
i 
I I'm distinguishing this case from the other cases that 
j Mr Romney has cited. 
THE COURT: Very well. Gentleman, I 
appreciate your arguments. Mr. Means, I think you 
raise an interesting issue. The Court is familiar 
with this area of the law, and I am able to rule from 
the bench on it, and I will do so. 
In this matter the Court finds that there 
was reasonable suspicion for the stop, and denies your 
motion to suppress. It's not without noting, however, 
that I think you have identified what --at least with 
00 S5 
something the Court is not opposed to looking at. I 
appreciate your bringing in a motion. Thank you. 
MR. MEANS: Thank you. If we could just get 
a trial setting, your Honor. 
THE COURT; Let'SCO. 
COURT CLERK; How much time are v/e looking 
au? 
MR. ROMNEY: Do we have the three officers? 
I would suppose, Shona, if it's a bench trial, we're 
not looking at over an hour. 
COURT CLERK: May 28^h at 2 p.m. 
MR. MEANS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, gentleman. We'll see 
you back for trial. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
j, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for ucib-
State of Urah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed 
under my direction from the electronic cape recording 
made of these proceedings. 
That this transcript is full, true, and correct 
and contains all of the evidence, all of the 
objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and al] 
matters to which the same relate which were audible 
through said tape recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore che name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the 
speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 9th day of 
October 1996. 
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